An expanding threat
It is of no doubt that the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) has recently been the utmost priority in the International Community's agenda thanks to its exceptionally provocative actions such as the Paris assault, downing a Russian plane in Egypt, and the Beirut bombings which received comparatively less dramatic media coverage. The massively extended military response falls short despite the involvement of some key NATO actors and, to some extent, Russian bombardments, which target IS logistics as well as regime opposition in Syria. However, what is new this time is that IS, unlike any other organizations of any such kind, has a quite complex and sophisticated social, political and economical organization. From the slavery market to other social dealings such as involvement in judicial processes in a totally controlled territory, an extremely well-financed economy, and its professionalism in branding and marketing through social media for recruitments, these aspects make it completely different from any other Islamist armed organizations such as Al-Qaeda or Boko Haram in terms of level of potential threat it has, which reach across international boundaries including the Western capitals. Most importantly, it possesses a wide and growing community of legitimation, particularly among Sunni populations oppressed under the post-Saddam Shia regime in Iraq and the Assad regime in Syria. This oppression perfectly serves as a "just cause", adopting the definition of Frédéric Gros's États de violence, and is perceived as barbaric scandals from the Western angle.

Leaving aside the possibility of further extensive NATO operations, with all options to be possibly backed by UN resolutions, including 'putting boots on the ground' which is increasingly credible after the US-Russia plan on Syrian transition and further cooperation, the YPG (People's Protection Units) and YPJ (Women's Protection Units) guerrilla units of the Kurdish PYD administration - which controls a large territory in the northern Syria or Rojava (Western Kurdistan) - are the most effective forces in the region, alongside Iraq's Kurdish Peshmerga army. These forces are struggling and gradually pushing IS towards its so-called capital Raqqa in Syria, while simultaneously securing their own position. The more they consolidate their gains, the more they become increasingly undesirable for neighbouring Turkey.

It is of no secret that certain Western allies in the Middle East implacably oppose the Assad regime, explicitly supporting opposition forces in addition to having alleged ties with the IS itself. Two major forces, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, are working hard to keep the balance with a clear division of tasks in terms of such support: the first financially, the latter logistically. Prioritizations simply collide; US-led coalition pursues IS which is deemed a major threat to the international community, whereas those two major Sunni Muslim actors prioritize the defeat of Shia Assad regime, which is responsible for the killings of hundreds of thousands of civilians, and which they consider utterly illegitimate. The strategy backfires in a vicious cycle: strengthening Assad's Shia regime means new recruits for IS on the part of angry Sunni sectors. On the other hand, debilitating the regime (which does not seem possible anymore) means the progress of IS in such an abyss. However, it is also crystal-clear that US-led coalition, which once made fierce demands on Assad to leave power unconditionally, is now seemingly in favour of pursuing a diplomatic transitional solution for the future of Syria, prioritizing only the destruction of Islamic State by military means and looking for a wider consensus on this policy. This is not an easy piece for Saudis and Turks to swallow.

Seeds of violence in Turkey
While the neighbouring war was going on with extreme humanitarian consequences and rapidly changing allegiances in the complex context of Syria, in which the IS caught major attention internationally, the results of the 7 June general elections in Turkey, and the following remarkable success of the HDP -which was now an inclusive project for total democratization state-wide in Turkey rather than a simply pro-Kurdish nationalist movement, as depicted in the media - triggered the tension. It was suspicious that all three of the attacks presumably carried out by IS - first, the Diyarbakır (Amed) bombing during HDP electoral campaign, and subsequently the Suruç and Ankara massacres - targeted the very essence of this new project, which was based on a fragile alliance between Turkey's leftist sectors and Kurdish liberation movement and principally orchestrated by the PKK's (Kurdistan Workers' Party) almighty leader and main ideologist Abdullah Öcalan (alias Apo). The timing of responsive actions of the PKK (partly denied by its Executive Board members) was also quite significant, with no room for contingency. After Tal Abyad's conquest from IS and its total control by the YPG/YPJ guerrillas, an extraordinary move, unifying once-surrounded Kobanê with the Cizîrê canton, consolidated the de facto Kurdish regime on Turkey's threshold. The Turkish military presence near Rojava began to immediately increase, preparing for a possible intervention through Jarabulus, the only remaining piece out of PYD control. The PKK's retaliation against Turkish security forces in Kurdish towns urged the Turkish government to deploy some elements of their military presence further north, preventing such an intervention in this strategic region. Needless to say, it also fits into the plans of President Erdoğan's backed AKP government to launch an offensive against Kurdish urban cells, namely the YDG-H (Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement), an armed nationalist youth organization evidently controlled by the PKK. By doing so he obtained the votes of Turkish nationalist citizens for the early elections to be held on 1 November. These elections were held while a low-density war was taking place in Turkey's Kurdistan region, with partial curfews and states of emergency declared in some densely populated key towns such as Cizre, Nusaybin, Yüksekova, Lîce and Silvan. Apart from the human tragedy and humiliations, both sides had certain pros and cons: Erdoğan's AKP eventually achieved a landslide victory after the disappointing results of 7 June, but it lost credibility through both its foreign and domestic diplomacy and its military presence near Syrian terrain. Kurds, on the other hand, lost considerable electoral support, but it also seemed that Rojava project, which was undoubtedly a stronger priority, was free from a direct Turkish threat.

Many thought that the escalating violence was temporary, and exclusively had to do with internal electoral dynamics, and that ultimately the tension would gradually reduce, opening the path for another negotiation process to be renewed after this short strategic break. However, the spectrum had already shifted, and the picture was wider and far more complex than before; after the Kobanê siege, during which hundreds of Kurdish guerrilla fighters from the north had been killed defending the town against IS, the paradigm in which Turkey's Kurdish question took place was no longer a specific matter for the Turkish state and its internal political manoeuvres, but rather an international issue involving further dynamics, ranging from the interests of principal international powers, as well as the local presence of highly-divided Kurds living in both Iraq and Syria. Despite the electoral victory, it was still quite frustrating for Turkey to have PYD regime right beside it, stuck on its long Syrian border and each day becoming more of a potential threat in a fragile context.

Escalating the war further
Optimistic predictions were just too naive. While the PYD's YPG/YPJ forces were ambitious to seize the Jarabulus area, the last remaining piece of the puzzle between Turkey and Syria, in order to connect all three Rojava cantons and eventually cut the connection between Turkey and IS, Turkey's strategy focused on indiscriminate extreme violence against its own nationalist Kurdish towns, where there was massive mobilization for aspirations to autonomous democracy, as its expectations to create a secure zone in Jarabulus faded away after anti-IS coalition members had turned up their nose to this unrealistic demand. It was also unthinkable and impossible anymore to dare to launch an offensive on Kurdish-controlled Syrian soils while the US Air Force was working closely in coordination with YPG/YPJ ground units against the IS. There were only a few feasible tactics left to prevent Kurds from consolidating their newly-constructed regime and turn them away from their determined route in the fight against IS: attacking them vigorously in their original bases and opening up another battle front in the north. Turkey's deployment of serious amount of military presence to the Northern Iraqi camp Ba'ashiqah, near IS controlled Mosul, probably has to do with this tactical change as well.

This is how the ongoing major, indiscriminate offensive with some ten thousand ground forces in key towns of Northern Kurdistan got launched. Operations were intensified first in the central historic province of Sur in the Kurdish capital Diyarbakır, resulting in the extrajudicial killings of YDG-H militants as well as many unarmed civilians: mostly low-class families who had emigrated from nearby villages to escape from the brutal military assaults of the 1990s and who lived under economic deprivation. Soon after Turkish military and police forces (at times with vaguely IS-like references of symbolic violence through graffiti signed as Esedullah teams) extended their operations through Cizre, Silopi, Nusaybin, Dargeçit, neighbouring towns to Rojava cantons with highly reputable Serhıldan (Kurdish expression for popular uprisings) tradition in early 1990s. Certain neighbourhoods have been under fierce military sieges, which include tanks and heavy artillery - ironically, exactly the sort of tactics for which Erdoğan himself once harshly criticized Assad regime. Humanitarian catastrophes have become apparent, as the curfews declared by local governors have been extended at times up to more than 20 days. Official media outlets echoed the repeated declarations of the Prime Minister Davutoğlu (seemingly the head of executive power but moving under Erdoğan's shade) that the main objective was the trenches dug in order to cut the access of the State and, ultimately, ensure its security. However, the destruction has gone far beyond a simple security issue or chasing after armed militants or youth activists. The merciless execution of Dilek Doğan by Turkish Special Police Units in a raid at her home was just one bloodcurdling example of scores of deliberate civilian killings. Now the brutality was present on both sides of the border to a similar degree.

The PKK's immediate response was not what Turkey expected, though. Kurdish HPG guerrilla units have no intention to become involved in a direct confrontation by deploying more militants from Rojava or their Northern Iraqi camps, but rather through a call for a popular self-defence against the military occupation. This has also been confirmed by the high-ranking PKK Commander and KCK Executive Board member Murat Karayılan in an interview with a Kurdish paper. Calling for diplomacy and dialogue, Commander Karayılan has underlined the relation between the ongoing Turkish offensive and the Kurdish struggle against the Islamic State in Syria. Although he uses menacing language, which imply that the PKK's armed HPG guerrilla units might also become involved if the tension escalates further, it seems that the PKK diplomacy is mature enough to see through the extremely provocative tactics - such as the assassination of famous Kurdish lawyer and leading peace activist Tahir Elçi in the middle of Diyarbakır - put into practice by their Turkish counterparts. The revolution under construction in Rojava which symbolizes diametrically opposite values of whatever the Islamic State stands for, is of the utmost priority and unquestionably paramount, and can not be compromised either by a relative number of loss in votes for HDP, nor casualties in the north. The success and consolidation of the Rojava revolution within a future IS-free Syrian state, in accordance with Öcalan's democratic co-federalist idea, will have a domino effect sooner or later in other parts of Kurdistan.

Apparently the PKK's highly disciplined short and medium-term military strategy is of harmonious character with its long-term political ambitions, among which the Rojava revolution sticks out most. Highly experienced visionary cadres follow quite closely the internal politics of both states where they have certain influence, as well as the broader context which includes the interests of relevant international actors. Constant hard-power strategy pumped by the IS in Syria and the State itself in Turkey merely serve for the further agitation and politization of forthcoming generations, refreshing the collective memory of the 1990s and, as a consequence, mean numberless new recruits. However, the panorama is not as bright as it seems, and one crucial fact cannot be ignored: the notion of physical force, as referred by Öcalan himself in early 80s, has always played a determining role in Kurdistan and the example of IS has apparently proven that this affirmation may well be extended for the entire Middle East where the long-term politics have never been that long-lasting.